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# CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



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## DAILY BRIEF

### I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

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*ok* USSR - Hungary: Khrushchev's decision, reported by Warsaw radio, to head the Soviet delegation to Hungary's "Liberation Day" ceremonies on 4 April indicates that the Kremlin desires to make unmistakably clear once again to the Hungarian party and people that the Kadar regime has

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[REDACTED]

Moscow's backing. His visit probably marks the resumption of greater personal activity by Khrushchev in dealing with the problems of the Eastern European countries.

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## II. ASIA-AFRICA

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*dp* Nasir's trip to Moscow: Nasir probably will request some form of Soviet economic concessions during his trip to Moscow scheduled for late April. He is likely to take advantage of the opportunity to try to arrange some kind of deal whereby the USSR would pay for Egyptian cotton in hard currencies. He may also feel that the visit is necessary to balance his recent action against pro-Soviet elements in Syria. [REDACTED] (Page 5)

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Gromyko Announces Unilateral Soviet Suspension of  
Nuclear Tests

Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko's announcement that the USSR will "unilaterally cease conducting tests of all forms of nuclear weapons" specified that the USSR may resume testing if Britain and the United States fail to follow suit. Moscow appears confident that this move will intensify popular pressures for early summit talks on Soviet terms.

Khrushchev probably believes the statement will have far-reaching repercussions in the non-Communist world, particularly in such countries as Britain, West Germany, and Japan where the question of nuclear weapons and tests is a major political issue.

Moscow has previously made it clear, particularly by various announcements of troop reductions, that it prefers to press the West to disarm through unilateral steps of its own rather than to sign disarmament agreements providing for inspection. Gromyko's announcement, climaxing two years of emphasis on test suspension as the priority disarmament goal, is a major move in the continuing Soviet campaign to establish a distinction between conventional and nuclear weapons in an effort to neutralize the West's nuclear retaliatory capabilities. An intensified propaganda campaign can be expected for a universal pledge to renounce the use of nuclear weapons.

Khrushchev's new Council of Ministers contains no surprises. He has added two deputy premiers but has left the Bulganin cabinet otherwise virtually intact. First Deputy Premier Mikoyan is probably number two in the hierarchy.

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Khrushchev to Head Soviet Delegation to Hungary

Khrushchev will head the Soviet delegation to Hungary's "Liberation Day" ceremonies on 4 April, according to Warsaw radio. The Soviet leader probably desires to make unmistakably clear to the Hungarians that their present regime retains Moscow's backing. Khrushchev last visited Budapest in January 1957 when, in company with other bloc leaders, he came to build up Kadar and to set the line for future developments following the revolution.

This endorsement of Kadar's leadership would also be intended to put an end to factional strife and rumors that Kadar might be ousted soon--a speculation that has arisen from his prolonged absence from public view and the announcement that he was "ill."

Khrushchev's visit could also be interpreted by Hungarians as an assurance that the relative degree of relaxation in some economic spheres will continue, although other stern policies will remain unchanged. Kadar's opponents in the party have been demanding a return to much harsher measures in all spheres of Hungarian life.

During his visit to Budapest, Khrushchev may take the opportunity to exchange views with the Yugoslav delegation on current Soviet-Yugoslav ideological differences--a strong possibility following Kadar's recent talks with Tito.

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Nasir's Trip to Moscow

Nasir probably will request some form of Soviet economic support during his forthcoming trip to Moscow, but another round of large-scale economic agreements appears unlikely. An Egyptian claim that Nasir accepted the invitation because he had given up hope of significant economic help from the West is probably aimed at eliciting some kind of Western offer. He may also feel that the visit is necessary to balance his recent action against pro-Soviet elements in Syria. Nasir has repeatedly postponed a trip to the USSR during the last two years.

Despite Egypt's critical foreign exchange situation, Nasir is not likely to increase Egypt's already heavy dependence on the Soviet bloc. He will more probably attempt to work out a deal whereby the bloc would pay hard currencies for at least part of its Egyptian cotton imports. Cairo is reported to have rejected earlier offers of additional Soviet loans to ease Egypt's foreign exchange shortages.

Nasir may also seek to reorganize and coordinate existing Soviet economic aid agreements with Egypt and Syria and give the public impression that he won a number of new economic concessions from the bloc in the name of the UAR.

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
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